The Musharraf regime is
“unlikely to evolve into a long- term ally in the
war on terrorism,” though the United States should
seek to “prevent Pakistan from descending into chaos
in the short term,” according to the Cato Institute,
a leading liberal think tank.
The Institute set up in
1977 to pursue libertarian values issues a handbook every
year for the consideration of Congress and the administration.
In its section on South Asia, Cato urges the US to vigorously
pursue Al Qaeda and Taliban elements inside Pakistan’s
territory - “preferably” in cooperation with
the Musharraf government - mobilise international support
to contain Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation and
hold it accountable for allowing the export of nuclear
military technology, and focus on India as a potential
long-
term military and economic partner of the United States
in the region.
Quoting the 9/11 Commission’s
recommendations on Pakistan that it described as “hard
choices,” Cato said the United States should commit
itself to a period of sustained aid, including military
assistance, to
Pakistan, but only on condition that Gen Pervez Musharraf
proves that he stands for ‘‘enlightened moderation’’
by confronting Islamic extremism, curbing nuclear proliferation,
and paving the way for the
return to democracy.
Cato said the “fundamental
conundrum” the United States has faced in its dealings
with Pakistan both before and after 9/11 lies in the recognition
that Islamabad’s pre-9/11 alliance with the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan and its strong ties to radical Islamic
terrorist groups helped to create the environment that
gave birth to Al Qaeda.
However, Cato noted that
the 9/11 Commission report portrays Pakistan as “dramatically
different” than it was before 9/11. The report implies
that the decision by Musharraf to sever his country’s
links to the
Taliban and provide logistical support for the US invasion
of Afghanistan marked a dramatic reversal in Pakistan’s
approach to radical Islamic terrorism.
Cato disagreed with the
commission’s conclusion that Pakistan has been evolving
into a reliable ally of the United States in the war on
terrorism, saying, “that conclusion is flawed. Pakistan
is not a
dependably effective strategic partner. The decision by
Musharraf to abandon the Taliban after 9/11 reflected
not a strategic choice but a tactical one. It was based
on the clear recognition that anything less
than full cooperation with the United States would result
in punishing American military retaliation, including
the invasion of parts of Pakistan, and possibly the overthrow
of the Musharraf government. At a minimum, the refusal
by Pakistan to back the American invasion of Afghanistan
would have led to the total diplomatic and economic isolation
of the regime, which could have played into the hands
of rival India in its bid for regional hegemony.”
Cato said that the assumption
that Pakistan has severed its ties with those who advocate
a radical Islamic agenda is “based more on the rhetoric
emanating from Islamabad than on the policy steps taken
there
since 9/11”. Referring to what the commission called
“an extraordinary public essay” by Gen Musharraf,
in which he called on Muslims to adopt a policy of “enlightened
moderation,” to shun militancy and extremism,
to seek to resolve disputes with “justice,”
and to help “better the Muslim world,” Cato
pointed out the this was in contrast to the fact that
there are scores of Al Qaeda terrorists, many Taliban
fighters and
perhaps Osama Bin Laden himself, in Pakistan.
Cato said Pakistan had
come frighteningly close to war with India over Kashmir
and was the favourite stomping ground of terrorist groups.
“Policymakers should focus on what attracts terrorists
to
Pakistan. In many respects, it is a ‘failed state’,
corruption is widespread, the government is ineffective,
and there is immense support among the general public
and the elites for radical Islamic causes.
Motivated by ideology and cheap tuition, millions of Pakistani
families send their children to religious schools, or
madrassas, which have become incubators for anti-Western
propaganda that contributes to the
terrorist problem.”
According to Cato, radical
Islamism is backed not only by leaders of large political
parties and by the tribes on the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border, but the Pakistan Army and intelligence services,
in particular,
are at best ambivalent about confronting Islamic extremists.
“Meanwhile, Islamic
terrorists have found refuge in Pakistan’s un- policed
regions, which now provide both a base of operations against
US forces in Afghanistan and a safe haven for planning
attacks against
Americans inside the United States. Widespread support
for extremist Islam in Pakistan may explain why many of
the Pakistani government’s early efforts to pursue
Al Qaeda members hiding along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border failed. That sentiment may also explain
why Musharraf’s government refused to vigorously
pursue former Taliban and Islamic militants gathered in
tribal, semiautonomous regions of Pakistan.”
Cato believes that the
“disappointing results” of Pakistan’s
early military offensives raise doubts about Gen Musharraf’s
ability to challenge the power of the local tribal leaders
in Waziristan. Despite
the military pressure and the financial rewards offered
by the United States, many Pakistanis continued to shelter
the militants, including foreigners who operate there.
At the same time, two assassination
attempts on Gen Musharraf in December 2003 seemed to have
mobilised the president to take action. The capture of
several Al Qaeda operatives during the summer of 2004
indicated a growing willingness on Gen
Musharraf’s part to pursue Al Qaeda terrorists.
Cato referred to Pakistan’s
“uneven record” in pursuing Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, and “troubling revelations” about
Dr AQ Khan. It said the official explanation that it was
a “rogue operation” were not believed
by the people in Pakistan. “The Khan network may
also have been a way for the military and intelligence
services to gain access to funds for covert operations
in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere. Musharraf’s
decision to pardon Khan immediately following the revelations
about his activities raises serious questions about Pakistan’s
commitment to non- proliferation. It also calls into question
the security of Pakistan’s
own nuclear military programme and underlines concerns
that Pakistan’s nuclear secrets could fall into
the hands of Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists.”
Cato claimed that throughout 2003 and 2004, the Bush
administration agreed under pressure from Islamabad not
to dispatch American and British forces to the tribal
areas inside Pakistan where senior Al Qaeda and Taliban
leaders were believed to be hiding. Also
troubling was the Bush administration’s decision
to designate Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally”.
Cato said American officials defend their support for
Pakistan by stressing that US policy is driven by the
short-
term goals of the war on terrorism and also that Gen Musharraf’s
government may present the only realistic chance to reach
an agreement over Kashmir.
According to the think
tank, “US policymakers should consider an alternate
interpretation of Pakistan’s behaviour. Since 9/11,
Musharraf has been opportunistic. He responded to political
and military pressure
from the United States by ending his country’s alliance
with the Taliban and other radical Islamic groups, taking
steps to liberalise his country’s political and
economic system, and opening the road to an
accord with India over Kashmir. But there are no signs
that Musharraf and his political and military allies have
made a strategic choice to ally themselves with US long-term
goals in the war on terrorism by
destroying the political and military infrastructure of
the radical and violent anti-American Islamic groups in
Pakistan. It is highly probable that Musharraf is not
strong enough to do so. From that perspective,
the partnership with the United States and Musharraf’s
willingness to negotiate with India over Kashmir are nothing
more than short-term moves aimed at winning US assistance
and preventing India from emerging
as Washington’s main ally in the region. If this
alternate interpretation is correct, the current American
relationship with Pakistan is, at best, a short-term alliance
of necessity. Over the medium and long term, US policymakers
should distance themselves from Musharraf’s regime,
seek out ways to cultivate liberal secular reforms in
Pakistan, and engage in more constructive relations with
India.”
