Reviewed by Shamim-ur-Rahman

This book is an account of the negotiations between the military regime and the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal that finally culminated in the adoption of the 17th amendment, giving more powers to General Pervez Musharraf. It gives the point of view of Mr S.M. Zafar who held the government's brief in the crucial negotiations which proved successful because of the MMA's willingness to work with Gen Musharraf through and through. Even a cursory reading of the book confirms that the MMA's strategy strengthened Gen Musharraf's hand and entrenched the military dispensation in the seat of power. Was it by design or was it a misreading of the evolving political development?

This was not the first time S.M. Zafar was involved in negotiating a deal for a military ruler with political elements. He therefore has some very useful information to share. Considerable space has been given to procedural matters for structuring the dialogue. It became obvious that while the military was not conducting negotiations as part of an exit strategy, the MMA was also not working towards that goal. The MMA's goal was to work out a modus vivendi for mutual coexistence while maintaining a facade of offering resistance to military rule.

The key underlying strategy of this negotiating process was to establish publicly that all efforts were being made to avoid the derailment of democracy. It was also aimed at sending signals to the international community about the democratic dispensation under a military ruler.

Before going into the details of the structured dialogue Mr Zafar also discusses the difference between a coup d'etat and a revolution. It is shocking to note that he has categorized Ayub Khan's intervention as a revolution, because the general had claimed so and had "given" a constitution, by dismantling the previous system, to perpetuate his own rule. More shocking is the author's failure to note that a military take-over is in any case unconstitutional and a claim by a dictator that his coup d'etat is a revolution does not give it legitimacy. Neither can the so-called law of necessity be used as a pretext to validate a coup.

It is clear from the book that Qazi Hussain Ahmed and others were critical of the president remaining in uniform and were not prepared to condone the "fraud of referendum". But at some point in time Qazi Hussain was willing to work with Gen Musharraf. In this context he is quoted by the author as saying, "If General Pervez Musharraf were to contest the election as a president, MMA would support him in the present circumstances."

It seems that points of agreement and disagreement that had emerged during the talks were a part of the public posturing by the MMA in particular to appease its electorate.

On the question of the president holding more than one office, despite a bar under Article 41 of the Constitution, the two parties settled on the following terms:

"Article 63 (1)(d) shall be made operative from a date to be mutually agreed between the parties (including the president) and that the constitutional package shall be finalized only when the cut out date is supplied."

Article 58(2)(b) came under discussion and it was noted that the parliamentary form of government had not yet taken roots therefore 58(2)(b) would prove to be helpful. The only objection the MMA had was that the arbitrary exercise of the president's power to dissolve the assembly had in the past harmed democracy. Therefore, if the remedy against the decision of the president was put on a fast track that might meet its objection.

Although the Constitution requires that the president should be elected by the electoral college consisting of the members of the Senate, National Assembly and the four provincial assemblies whose votes are counted in a specified manner, Mr Zafar also describes how and why the MMA agreed to his suggestion that the vote of confidence should be treated as an alternative mode of General Musharraf's election.

The MMA leadership had in its earlier round of talks indicated that if the president were to contest the election as required by the Constitution the MMA would support him. But the author writes that on the contrary the MMA leadership found the suggestion regarding a vote of confidence an easy way to get out of their commitment to give the vote to the president.

When the issue of giving the vote of confidence to the president was taken up, Qazi Hussain Ahmed proved a hard bargainer. He said as the MMA did not agree with many policies of the present government the MMA could not give its vote to the president. "It will be tantamount," he said, "to endorsing his policies." Qazi Hussain Ahmed was fiercely critical of the government policies on Afghanistan and Iraq. He also denounced the 'modernism' of General Pervez Musharraf. Qazi Hussain Ahmed suggested that the rules providing for the manner of casting the votes may also contain a declaration that the votes cast only express confidence in the continuation of General Musharraf as president. Qazi Hussain Ahmed rebutted Mr Zafar's suggestion by saying that in politics people do not read the rules framed by the federal government. They observed the conduct of political parties against a broad backdrop.

The author claims that Qazi Hussain Ahmed and the Chief Minister of the NWFP, Mr Akram Durrani, and the MMA negotiating team also indicated their willingness to accept and include in the constitutional package a vote of confidence mechanism for the president and yet not vote for him. In this way the MMA leadership intended to maintain its political posture but at the same time facilitate the progress of the negotiation towards a solution.

But according to Aitzaz Ahsan, as recalled by Mr Zafar, "by substituting 'vote of confidence' for 'election' the MMA had endorsed the fraud of the referendum".

This proclamation of truth had put the MMA on the defensive and Qazi Hussain Ahmed denounced the 17th amendment bill contending it was not in line with the accord. But Maulana Fazlur Rahman defended the package claiming that to conclude a dialogue successfully you have to move beyond the stated position. The fact that the MMA had been focusing more on public posturing rather than using its power to force an exit option on the military ruler also became obvious when the MMA walked out during Gen Musharraf's address to the parliament, after having supported the 17th Amendment which legitimized the general's presidency. According to S.M. Zafar a senior MMA leader told him, "If we were seen on the TV screen, sitting and listening to General Pervez Musharraf while he unfolded his road map, our electorate would have interpreted it as a surrender.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dialogue on the Political Chess Board

By S.M. Zafar

Brite Books, Ghazni Street, Urdu Bazar, Lahore

Tel: 042-7226406

Email: [email protected]

ISBN 969-8780-01-7

305pp. Rs450