President General Pervez Musharraf touched base with President George W Bush last Saturday. The meeting follows the latter’s return to office and the former’s resolve not to doff the uniform after December 31, 2004. Mr Bush will remain in office till 2008 and General Musharraf would like to be still president when the next general elections are held in Pakistan in 2007. A lot will doubtless happen in Pakistan before that but for any Pakistani leader to rule in Pakistan external support is traditionally a crucial factor. Hence the meeting was an important sign of what lies ahead. The agendas the two leaders discussed assume that policies decided upon between them would be carried forward. Mr Bush did not emphasise too much the need for Pakistan to become fully democratic and General Musharraf did not say if he felt bad about what his host was doing in Iraq.

There was leeway for bringing in the Palestine issue. When General Musharraf said that the Palestinian state should be allowed to come into being as a solution to the Middle East crisis, his host simply repeated his stance on the creation of a Palestinian state. When, talking to the press, General Musharraf tried to link the Palestine issue with the “core issue” of global terrorism, a White House “explanation” stated that the two issues were not linked during the meeting between the two presidents. Of course, the two presidents exploited the theme of terrorism to their advantage. Mr Bush said Pakistan was playing a great role against Al Qaeda and he was completely satisfied with what General Musharraf had done so far.

The Al Qaeda has been a bit of a problem between Islamabad and the American military commands in Afghanistan. So has been the question of South Waziristan. The rumour that Pakistan had downgraded its Wana Operation was waved aside by Mr Bush. He did not comment on the possible location of Osama bin Laden either, although Kabul has been speculating that he could be either in Azad Kashmir or in Karachi. If Washington kept its side of the roster of demands under wraps, Pakistan, too, is supposed to have decided not to make public its latest plaints on the conduct of India in the composite dialogue. Mr Musharraf said he had raised the question of F16 aircraft — 25 of them that he needs at $25 million apiece — but a US official said there was nothing to report on the issue, which means whatever you may make of it.

Both presidents did, however, discuss bilateral trade. Pakistan wants more access to US markets and General Musharraf may rightly assume that his special equation with his counterpart should be able to pry open a market that has clammed up because of the bad news that doesn’t stop coming out of Pakistan, thanks mainly to a couple of alarmist newspapers in the United States. Pakistan was doing well in terms of its improved levels of exports till the fag-end of the year 2004 when the skyrocketing costs of oil imports tended to nullify the export gains. From July to November the trade deficit grew four times over, mainly because of the hike in the price of oil. This means that Pakistan will need to export more to make up for the deficit now feeding into the country’s inflation rate.

There is a bipartisan foundation to what the American president has to do to prop up Pakistan. Bill S2845 under the section “United States commitment to the future of Pakistan” desires that the “United States should, over a long-term period, help to ensure a promising, stable, and secure future for Pakistan.” The bill is at present in the House of Representative. It wants “to encourage and enable Pakistan to continue and improve upon its commitment to combating extremists; to seek to resolve any outstanding difficulties with its neighbours and other countries in its region; to continue to make efforts to fully control its territory and borders; to progress towards becoming a more effective and participatory democracy; to participate more vigorously in the global marketplace and to continue to modernise its economy; to take all necessary steps to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction; to continue to reform its education system; and to, in other ways, implement a general strategy of moderation.”

The bill, representing the enactment of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, stipulates that “not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a detailed proposed strategy for the future, long-term engagement of the United States with Pakistan. The strategy required by this subsection may contain a classified annex”. When it comes to democracy and non-proliferation, Mr Bush would be hard pressed to enunciate a clear enough policy to satisfy his Congress. But equally, General Musharraf may be hard pressed to stick to the aims and objectives outlined therein.