Inside Clinton's secret
chamber
Engaging India
(Diplomacy, Democracy and
the Bomb)
Strobe Talbott
Published by Brookings
Institution Press, Washington DC
Pages: 268
Latest book by America's former deputy secretary of state
Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, is meant to describe Indo-US
relations during Clinton's times. But it has much to reveal
about Pakistan as well. Talbott, who worked for 21 years
in Time magazine as a columnist and correspondent before
becoming the deputy secretary of state, had old association
with Bill Clinton being his contemporary in Oxford days
when the latter was a Fulbright scholar there in late
1960s. It seems both of them shared a common fascination
for India triggered by history books read by them. "I
remember him toting around Robert Blake's biography of
Disraeli for several weeks in the fall of 1969 and talking
about it in pubs and in the kitchen of the house we shared.
Then same year he read E M Forster's A Passage to India
for the first time," writes Talbott about Clinton.
Talbott's wife Brooke Shearer
also stayed with an Indian family in 1968 when she visited
the country sponsored by Experiment in International Living.
So India was close to Talbott's heart when he took over
as the deputy secretary of state.
But to the chagrin of Clinton
administration, India carried out nuclear tests in 1998.
The situation was worsened by the fact that India kept
their preparation for the tests so secret that CIA or
any other American agency could hardly get a clue of it.
Talbott writes that the whole administration turned against
India and wanted to clamp stringent sanctions for conducting
the nuclear tests. India justified the tests
by pointing to its two neighbors -- "China an overt
nuclear weapons state on our borders, a state which committed
armed aggression against India in 1962 and Pakistan a
covert nuclear weapons state that had committed aggression
against India three times and that continued to sponsor
terrorism in Kashmir."
Talbott responded to the
occasion by developing direct rapport with then Indian
foreign minister Jaswant Singh from whom, it appears,
Talbott is enormously impressed. The backflap of the book
also carries a picture of the two. Talbott's purpose in
establishing the link was to direct US efforts towards
bringing round India to sign NPT or CTBT, having accepted
the fact that the country had become a nuclear power.
He describes in details the discussions he had with Jaswant
Singh who skillfully sold the BJP government's point of
view to his American counterpart though it hardly satisfied
Clinton and his close circle of advisers.
The dust had not yet settled
after Indian tests when Pakistan also announced its intention
to retaliate with its own nuclear blasts. The most stressed
man at this juncture was Clinton who did not want Pakistan
to follow suit. His administration planned to prevail
upon Pakistan's then prime minister Nawaz Sharif not to
go ahead with his plans to explode its nuclear devices.
Talbott has described details of
the administration's efforts towards this end.
He writes: "Clinton
telephoned Nawaz Sharif the Pakistan prime minister, to
whet his appetite for the planes, huge amounts of financial
aid and a prize certain to appeal to Sharif -- an invitation
from him to make an official visit to Washington. Sharif
was not swayed. 'You can almost hear the guy wringing
his hands and sweating,'
Clinton said after hanging up".
Having failed to evince
any reply from Nawaz Sharif, Talbott was directed by the
president to visit Pakistan and make the case to Nawaz
Sharif personally. But an invitation for his visit could
only be obtained through the good offices of General Jahangir
Karamat, then Pakistan's army chief, which according to
Talbott proved that "the civilian leaders were in
a state of confusion perhaps discord and the
military called the shots in Pakistan."
In Pakistan Talbott first
met foreign minister Gohar Ayub and foreign secretary
Shamshad Ahmad who did not agree to the American proposal.
Shamshad to the disliking of the Americans was more vocal.
Talbott quotes Shamshad Ahmad as saying: "The people
of Pakistan will not forgive those in this room if we
do not do the right thing". Then Talbott met General
Karamat. "He heard us out and acknowledged the validity
of at least some of our arguments... His government was
still wrestling with the question what to do... (When)
Karamat talked about his country's political leadership
a subtle but discernible undertone of long-suffering patience
bordering on scorn" was apparent. Briefing the American
delegation about the historic Indian attitude towards
Pakistan, Karamat assured them that "given the political,
military,
historic and economic stakes involved the Pakistani government
is carefully weighing what to do."
Then Talbott met prime
minister Nawaz Sharif. He writes: "What we got from
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was a Hamlet act, convincing
in its own way -- that is I think he was genuinely feeling
torn -- but rather pathetic... On this occasion he seemed
nearly paralyzed with exhaustion, anguish and fear. He
was literally just as Clinton had sensed during their
phone call --wringing his hands. He had yet to make
up his mind but he said, 'I am an elected official and
I can not ignore popular sentiment.'"
When Talbott revealed to
Sharif the Clinton plan of 'dramatizing' the world's gratitude
to him during the latter's visit to USA if he just refrained
from testing, Nawaz Sharif asked, "Will Clinton promise
to skip India on his trip and come only to Pakistan?"
There was no way Talbott could promise that but he told
Sharif that Clinton would
recalibrate the length and character of the stops in Delhi
and Islamabad. He writes, "Sharif looked more miserable
than ever." Kashmir came up repeatedly during the
meeting. Nawaz Sharif told Talbott that Kashmir and not
nuclear issue was at the core of the tension between India
and Pakistan.
Talbott did not enjoy his
dealings with Shamshad and goes on to write: "Towards
the end of the meeting Sharif asked every one but me to
wait outside. Shamshad seemed miffed. He glanced nervously
over his shoulder as he left." Sharif told Talbott
in privacy that if he did as they wanted the next time
"you came to Islamabad you would find yourself not
dealing with a clean-shaven moderate but an Islamic
fundamentalist 'with a long beard.'"
Pakistan went ahead with
its tests and when Talbott broke the news to Clinton,
"He scowled, looked down at floor and silent for
what seemed a long moment, 'That's bad' he finally said
shaking his head, 'real bad. Those folks have got a kind
of genius for making a bad deal worse'."
Talbott writes that Nawaz
Sharif a number of times asked Clinton to mediate on Kashmir
between India and Pakistan as America did between Israel
and Egypt but Clinton would express his inability saying
that for mediation both the parties should approach the
mediator. In this case India was not interested. But it
seems that Clinton was definitely interested in easing
out situation between the two nuclear neighbours as he
mentioned to his advisors. They wanted a solution of the
problem
by dividing Kashmir along the Line of Control and giving
more autonomy to Indian-held part of the region. Clinton
might have personally helped in the solution of the issue
but according to Talbott Kargil episode was yet another
event that isappointed Clinton enormously.
Talbott has written in
detail what transpired between Clinton and Nawaz Sharif
on that occasion. He writes about the Lahore Summit between
Vajpai and Sharif and Musharraf's elevation as Chief of
Army Staff in these words, "It quickly became apparent
that the new chief of the army staff Parvez Musharraf
had even less regard for Sharif and the civilian leadership
than his predecessor Karamat. In particular Musharraf
found the Lahore Summit galling".
About Kargil he writes,
"The American Government followed the conflict with
growing alarm which could easily become a nuclear cataclysm...
Tony (Zinni) warned Musharraf that India would cross the
LoC itself if Pakistan did not pull back. Musharraf professed
to be unimpressed. Back in Washington the administration
let it be known that if Sharif did not order a pullback
we would hold up $ 100 million IMF loan that Pakistan
sorely needed... We did not know whether Sharif had personally
ordered the infiltration above Kargil (doubtful) reluctantly
acquiesced in it (more likely) or not even known about
it until after it happened (possible). But there was no
doubt that he now realized that it was colossal blunder".
Talbott writes that "through
our ambassador in Islamabad Sharif begged Clinton to come
to his rescue with a plan that would stop the fighting
and set the stage for a US-brokered solution to Kashmir".
In reply to Sharif's phone call Clinton said that he would
consider it only if Pakistan first unilaterally withdrew.
"The next day Sharif called to say that he was packing
his bags and getting ready to fly immediately
to Washington -- never mind that he has not been invited.
'This guy's coming literally on a wing and a prayer,'
said the president. Sharif was not given the proper protocol
and was received by Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia and
brought to Blair House who informed the Americans that
'they should be prepared to deal with a man who was not
just distraught about the crisis but terrified of the
reaction from
Musharraf and the military if he gave in to American pressure.'
Talbott suggested to Clinton
that if Sartaj Aziz and Shamshad would participate in
the meeting it would not be productive so the president
should have a two to one meeting with Sharif attended
by one aide. In the meeting instead of relenting Sharif
made the matter worse by linking withdrawal from Kargil
with solution of Kashmir dispute. Talbott writes that
Clinton came as close to as I had ever seen blowing
up in a meeting with a foreign leader. But after giving
him a lecture on history Clinton switched from "chastising
Sharif for the reckless stupidity of Kargil to complementing
him on his earlier contribution to moment of diplomatic
promise." "Having listened to Sharif's complaints
against United States he had a list of his own and it
started with
terrorism... Clinton had worked himself back into real
anger -- his face flushed... Sharif seemed beaten, physically
and emotionally. He denied he had given any orders with
regards to nuclear weaponry and said he was worried for
his life." The meeting however ended on a happy note
and friendly feeling on Clinton's part after Sharif signed
the press note. "As the president and his advisers
were leaving Blair House
Shamshad Ahmad scurried after Sandy with alterations he
wanted in the text. Sandy kept walking and said briskly
over his shoulder, 'Your boss says it's okay as it is.'"
