The recent change across
Pakistan’s political spectrum with the quick replacement
of a prime minister followed by plans to bring in a chosen
next prime minister - all in the space of hardly two months,
has been promoted as the consequence of a natural parliamentary
process. But in a country where the military continues
to dominate politics, such changes do not take place without
the consent of the all too powerful establishment led
by the Generals. The premature departure of Mir Zafarullah
Khan Jamali, Pakistan’s first prime minister of
the new millennium, speaks volumes over the weak state
of the country’s democracy, almost 56 years after
its independence.
There were many faults
surrounding Mr Jamali’s all too un-consequential
government. But the manner in which he appears to have
stepped down, a day after vehemently denying that he was
leaving, is in itself bears testimony to the paucity of
democracy despite a transition to civilian rule.
In sharp contrast to workings
of a normal democracy, Pakistan remains a country where
democratic institutions have failed to take root - thanks
to the frequent removal of elected leaders, coupled with
the long years of military rule. With this legacy and
the recent change, there are more compelling questions
now than before surrounding the Pakistani military’s
role in national politics.
Beyond politics, the military’s
impression is felt in a wide range of institutions - thanks
to the inductions of a number of retired officers to perform
civilian duties. It comes as no surprise that there should
be cause for alarm surrounding Pakistan’s future
as a civilian run and democratic political country.
The Pakistani military’s
increasing involvement in national politics is bound to
bear consequences in five vital areas: First, the military’s
presence on the scene is bound to continue eroding other
important institutions involved with politics and administration
of key functions. President Pervez Musharraf, the military
ruler now in his fifth year, has overseen unprecedented
exercises to improve the system of governance through
bringing in a so-called devolution order.
To many, this experiment
is indeed meant to buttress the Pakistani military’s
oft-repeated exercise of creating a new political order,
each time a democratic system is forcibly disrupted. Rather
than working to consolidate the best interest of Pakistan,
such new political orders only erode with the passage
of time. Their biggest missing element indeed is the failure
to build up institutions over time, and that, too, through
an evolutionary process. Quick fixes, as always can never
provide solutions to the many challenges faced by the
country as Pakistan becomes an increasingly difficult
country to rule, the large chunk of its population lives
without hope for a more prosperous future and such unfortunate
indications of a societal erosion such as crime and lawlessness
continue at an increasingly alarming pace.
Second, the lack of the
public’s all out and robust support to any military
government is often compensated through the military working
consciously to forge close ties with the Western World,
most notably the United States. It’s not surprising
that a succession of Pakistan’s military rulers
have ended up becoming proxies for Washington’s
strategic interests in the region surrounding the country.
The misfortune of such relations is often that they run
in contrast to the public’s mood in Pakistan. Under
President Musharraf too, the popular mood among Pakistanis
ranges from at least an element of scepticism to outright
opposition to the United States, as accounts of Washington’s
many excesses ranging from support to Israel to the treatment
of Iraqi prisoners, makes the round. The balancing act
that’s necessary to appeal to the West, while also
tackling the public’s displeasure in Pakistan, is
something best left to a credible politically representative
government rather than a nominated one.
Third, the military’s
dominance is bound to undermine long-term economic interests
in a country where the ruling regime continues to celebrate
the economic turnaround, which is yet to make an impact
on the lives of much of the mainstream population. Indeed,
the seven points for future reforms articulated by President
Musharraf in a memorable speech after the coup in 1999,
fell upon receptive ears. One fundamental dimension of
those points was to rid Pakistan of its so-called ‘sham’
democracy before the coup.
Abandoning the ideal of
reforming Pakistan and tackling some of the worst elements
of the legacy from the 90s has caused much harm to the
image of the country’s leaders. Many faces in Parliament,
with claims of loyalty to President Musharraf, belong
to those surrounded by allegations of corruption. The
switch back from a reforming future to a status quo past
has meant that the entire machinery of the government
works in tandem with the unwelcome values of yesteryears.
Consequently, efforts to reform the economy in a fundamental
way are bound to suffer. Beyond bringing together some
of the best macro-economic indicators, though more to
the credit of events following the New York terrorist
attacks than home grown efforts, the government may have
created the basis for a micro-economic transition. But
that micro-economic transition is bound to fail, for as
long as fundamental institutions of governance remain
in a state of erosion, and political power continues to
flow from a singular high office in the land.
Fourth, time and again
the Pakistan military is at a clash with political groups,
especially opposition groups. This is bound to work adversely
for the best long-term interests of Pakistan. A nation
faced with the kinds of internal and external challenges
as Pakistan, can just not afford to move towards further
polarisation and deepening divisions. Even the most fundamental
defence and security interests are bound to be compromised,
if the Pakistani public and political representatives
remain on the periphery of representative politics, with
the reins of power entirely in the hands of a military-led
establishment. Evolving fresh national consensus on the
most vital issues is then bound to become more a bureaucratic
exercise, confined to the purview of a few, rather than
the ideal of a broad-based part of the population.
Finally, the development
of any society inevitably must suffer when its Parliament
and Parliamentary representatives weaken over a period
of time. When political representatives, parties and politicians
weaken, the effect is bound to travel down to the lower
tiers of society. Consequently, the vacuum of popular
leadership must fuel increasing anarchy, violence and
perhaps even tribalism. If this is indeed the tragic course
for Pakistan’s future, it would not be the first
time that such adverse trends were to appear in a country
without truly representative politics.
Events of the past two
weeks have exposed even the few remaining bits of representative
politics in Pakistan, given the speed with which three
prime ministers - past, present and future - have appeared
on the horizon. But Pakistan’s future outlook only
carries one certain assurance. The assurance is, indeed,
that of the military’s increasing presence in national
politics, even if that was to adversely affect the military’s
own interests along with the multi-fold interests of Pakistan.
